موسسه جغرافیا پژوهش‌های جغرافیای برنامه‌ریزی شهری 2383-1456 14 2 2026 07 23 Analyzing the Relationships and Interactions of Urban Management Stakeholders in Iran Using the Power-Interest Matrix and the MACTOR Method تحلیل روابط و تعاملات ذی‌نفعان مدیریت شهری ایران با بهره‌گیری از ماتریس قدرت–علاقه و روش MACTOR 127 146 108769 10.22059/jurbangeo.2026.409058.2146 FA نیما بایرام‌زاده گروه جغرافیا، دانشگاه ارومیه، ارومیه، ایران 0000-0003-2013-4922 ناصر سلطانی گروه جغرافیا، دانشگاه ارومیه، ارومیه، ایران 0009-0000-1064-1889 اکبر هوشمند گروه جغرافیا، دانشگاه ارومیه، ارومیه، ایران 0009-0001-0380-6363 Journal Article 2026 03 29 ABSTRACTThe primary objective of this study is to analyze the relationships and network of urban management stakeholders in Iran. Methodologically, this research adopted a mixed-methods approach (quantitative and qualitative). Data were collected using both library research and fieldwork. The sample size consisted of 15 questionnaires, determined and completed based on the principle of theoretical saturation in qualitative research and expert judgment, utilizing the snowball sampling method. The data analysis was conducted in three stages: 1) identification of the main and key stakeholders; 2) construction of the power–interest matrix; and 3) mapping of the relationships and interactions among the actors using the MACTOR analysis method. The results indicate that Iran’s urban management structure is characterized by inequalities in power, influence, and competitiveness among stakeholders. In particular, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) stands out as the most central actor, possessing the highest level of influence and competitiveness, and playing a decisive role in directing decision-making processes. Meanwhile, the Plan and Budget Organization and the Ministry of Interior act as powerful, bidirectional players—both influencing and being influenced—with the stability of the urban management system being highly dependent on the nature of interactions with them. The urban governance structure remains reliant on the concentration of power within governmental and sovereign institutions, while simultaneously exhibiting a high level of interest among economic and executive actors. This imbalance between formal power and social/local capacities tends to restrict the role of non-governmental stakeholders in the decision-making process.Extended AbstractIntroductionIn recent decades, the increasing complexity of urban issues in Iran—ranging from unbalanced urban expansion and environmental unsustainability to challenges of local governance and public participation—has meant that urban management can no longer be regarded as the responsibility of a single institution or organization. Contemporary urban management constitutes a multilevel network of governmental, public, private, and civil actors, each of whom participates in decision-making and implementation processes, bringing distinct interests, resources, and capacities for influence. However, the lack of institutional coordination, overlap of responsibilities, centralized decision-making, and weak linkages between national and local institutions have reduced the efficiency and legitimacy of the urban management system. In such circumstances, stakeholder network analysis can reveal patterns of relationships as well as the degree of influence and interaction among key actors, thereby providing a foundation for designing synergistic mechanisms.Moreover, one of the fundamental challenges of urban management in Iran is the absence of institutionalized mechanisms for synergy among stakeholders, such that the capacities of governmental organizations, local councils, the private sector, civil society, and citizens are not coordinated toward sustainable urban development (Mohammad-Rezazadeh, 2025; Doveyran, 2025). Information opacity, institutional distrust, and weak participatory frameworks have led to conflicts of interest and resource wastage (Goudarzi & Mirzaei, 2025; Emami & Shakeri, 2015). Therefore, it is necessary to employ a stakeholder network analysis approach to identify and analyze the structure of relationships among urban management actors in Iran and, based on this analysis, to design mechanisms for synergy, coordination, and multilevel participation. This would enable the urban management system to move away from a fragmented and sectoral approach toward integrated and network-based governance. In this regard, the main objective of this research is to analyze the relationships and stakeholder network of urban management in Iran, addressing the question: “What is the nature of relationships and the stakeholder network within Iran’s urban management system?” MethodologyFrom a methodological perspective, the study adopted a mixed-methods approach (quantitative and qualitative) based on the nature of the data. Data were collected through both library-based research and fieldwork. The sample size consisted of 15 questionnaires, which were determined and completed based on the principle of theoretical saturation and using the snowball sampling method. Data analysis was conducted in three stages: 1) identification of the main and key stakeholders; 2) formation of the power–interest matrix; and 3) mapping of the relationships and interactions among the actors using the MACTOR analysis method. Results and DiscussionThe findings derived from the stakeholder analysis and the results of the MACTOR analysis clearly indicate that the structure of urban management in Iran is deeply influenced by the “top-down” nature of the national planning and policymaking system. The concentration of power, resources, and decision-making authority within national and sovereign institutions—such as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Planning and Budget Organization, and the Ministry of Interior—has led to the formulation of major policies at the national level, while local levels predominantly assume the role of implementers and followers of these decisions. Although this hierarchical pattern strengthens vertical coherence and governmental control, it simultaneously circumscribes the operational latitude of local institutions and undermines the efficacy of participatory mechanisms in the urban decision-making process. The results of the Power–Interest Matrix and the competitiveness index further confirm that local actors, despite their high level of interest in urban issues, possess significantly less institutional power and influence compared to upper-level authorities.In this context, the significant power held by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) within the network of Iran’s urban management stakeholders can be attributed to its pivotal position in the country’s legal and political structure. Unlike numerous urban management systems where a substantial portion of decision-making authority is devolved to local levels, in Iran, a major share of the legal, financial, and institutional frameworks governing city administration is determined at the national level. Consequently, as the legislative body, the Parliament plays a decisive role in shaping the rules governing urban management, defining the scope of authority for municipalities and city councils, enacting laws related to municipal revenue sources, and regulating the relationship between the central government and local governance. Beyond its legislative power, the Parliament’s role in approving budget laws and overseeing the allocation of public resources is another critical factor that enhances its influence within the urban management network. Many decisions pertaining to urban infrastructure development, project financing, and the distribution of national credits are directly or indirectly influenced by legislative and budgetary processes. Thus, the Parliament affects the behavior of other urban management actors not only by enacting laws but also by controlling the flow of resources and determining development priorities.On the other hand, urban management in Iran is characterized by a multisectoral structure, meaning that many urban issues—such as transportation, housing, spatial development, environment, and municipal finance—fall under various legal and policy domains. This topical fragmentation has enabled the legislative body to assume a prominent role in coordinating and regulating relationships among different agencies. In such circumstances, the Parliament has become a central actor in the urban management network due to its legal legitimacy, regulatory power, and access to oversight tools. However, while such a concentration of power in national institutions can potentially foster coordination and policy coherence, in the absence of effective participatory and decentralization mechanisms, it may lead to a reduction in local management autonomy and the constraint of local capacities. Therefore, the core challenge in Iran’s urban management structure is not the elimination of national institutions’ roles, but rather the establishment of a balance between their regulatory power and the enhancement of local actors’ agency and capacity.Within this structure, local policies implemented at the urban and neighborhood scales are influenced more by pre-determined national frameworks and requirements than by the active participation of citizens, local associations, and civil society organizations. This situation undermines micro-level participation, diminishes social ownership of urban plans and programs, and limits institutional learning at the local level. In other words, the gap between macro-level national policy-making and local needs and priorities results in social participation being largely formal or consultative, rather than playing a meaningful role in decision-making. The persistence of this model, without redefining power relations and strengthening bottom-up institutional mechanisms for participation, may perpetuate state-centric urban management and undermine sustainable and participatory urban governance.ConclusionWithin the framework of Iran’s political system and urban management mechanisms, this pattern can be understood as a product of a centralized governance structure, administrative hierarchy, and the precedence of legal legitimacy over social legitimacy. Despite the presence of elected institutions such as the Islamic City Councils, urban management in Iran remains largely dominated by appointed and sectoral bodies—such as the Ministry of Interior, provincial governorships, and the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development—which possess substantial legal and political authority. In such a context, the design of synergistic mechanisms requires the establishment of institutional linkages between powerful actors and those endowed with social and knowledge-based capital. This can be pursued through strengthening the position of city councils, institutionalizing neighborhood-based participation, and transforming sectoral interactions into horizontal governance networks. Without such institutional redesign, the stakeholder network of urban management will remain imbalanced, and the potential for genuine synergy among the state, the market, and local society will not be fully realized.Accordingly, the achievement of effective and sustainable urban management necessitates the redesign of institutional mechanisms to enhance vertical coordination among national, provincial, and local levels, as well as to strengthen horizontal participation among municipalities, the private sector, professional institutions, and local communities. The findings emphasize that only through a more balanced distribution of power, greater transparency of interests, and the institutionalization of participation can a synergistic network of urban stakeholders—aligned with the requirements of Iran’s political and administrative system—be formed.FundingThere is no funding support. Authors’ ContributionThe authors have each made distinct and significant contributions to this research. The first author was responsible for the research design, data collection, conducting the analyses, and drafting the initial manuscript. The second author contributed to refining the theoretical framework, analyzing the results, providing scientific revision, and performing the final editing of the manuscript. The third author assisted with data collection, conducting the analyses, and drafting the initial manuscript Conflict of InterestAuthors declared no conflict of interest. AcknowledgmentsWe are grateful to all the scientific consultants of this paper. هدف اصلی پژوهش، تحلیل روابط و شبکه ذی‌نفعان مدیریت شهری در کشور ایران می‌باشد. رویکرد روش‌شناختی پژوهش حاضر از نظر ماهیت داده‌ها، ترکیبی (کمی و کیفی) است همچنین جمع‌آوری داده‌ها به دو صورت کتابخانه‌ای و میدانی صورت گرفته است. حجم نمونه این پژوهش شامل ۱۵ پرسشنامه است که بر اساس اصل اشباع نظری در پژوهش‌های کیفی و مطالعات مبتنی بر قضاوت خبرگان و با بهره‌گیری از روش نمونه‌گیری گلوله برفی تعیین و تکمیل‌شده است. تجزیه‌وتحلیل داده‌های پژوهش در 3 مرحله که شامل: 1) شناسایی ذینفعان اصلی و کلیدی، 2) تشکیل ماتریس قدرت- علاقه و 3) ترسیم نقشه‌ای از روابط و تعاملات بازیگران با استفاده از روش تحلیل مکتور صورت گرفته است. نتایج این پژوهش نشانگر این است که ساختار مدیریت شهری ایران با نابرابری در سطح قدرت، اثرگذاری و رقابت‌پذیری ذینفعان همراه است؛ به‌گونه‌ای که مجلس شورای اسلامی به‌عنوان محوری‌ترین بازیگر، بالاترین میزان اثرگذاری و رقابت‌پذیری را داراست و نقشی تعیین‌کننده در جهت‌دهی تصمیمات ایفا می‌کند، درحالی‌که سازمان برنامه‌وبودجه کشور و وزارت کشور نیز به‌عنوان بازیگران قدرتمند و دوجانبه، هم اثرگذار و هم اثرپذیر بوده و پایداری نظام مدیریت شهری تا حد زیادی به نحوه تعامل با آن‌ها وابسته است. ساختار حکمرانی شهری همچنان متکی بر تمرکز قدرت در نهادهای دولتی و حاکمیتی و درعین‌حال برخوردار از سطح بالای علاقه در میان بازیگران اقتصادی و اجرایی است که این عدم توازن میان قدرت رسمی و ظرفیت‌های اجتماعی و محلی، موجب محدود شدن نقش ذی‌نفعان غیر حاکمیتی در فرآیند تصمیم‌سازی خواهد شد. https://jurbangeo.ut.ac.ir/article_108769_35eac895365eb23f12f6d93cf1efc340.pdf