The intersection of the water stress crisis and land subsidence in the Tehran metropolis is less a function of climatic variables and more the product of deficiencies in managerial structures and incoherence across decision-making layers. Accordingly, the theoretical and empirical problem of this research is the structural inefficiency and institutional deadlock within Tehran's urban management system, which has undermined its capacity to respond to the water scarcity crisis and its resulting physical hazards. Addressing the theoretical and empirical question regarding which dimension of institutional capacities in the current urban management structure is the most damaging, this study adopts an adaptive analysis model approach to assess and pathology-test the institutional capacities of urban governance across three layers: "knowledge," "relational," and "mobilization capacity."

This applied research utilizes a descriptive-analytical methodology, gathering data through the analysis of macro-level documents and a specialized questionnaire administered to 40 experts selected via purposive sampling. The findings reveal that Tehran faces a paradox of "accumulation of technical knowledge and poverty of institutional capacity." While knowledge capacity stands at a relatively favorable level, "relational capacity"—hindered by institutional fragmentation between the municipality and the Ministry of Energy—constitutes the weakest link in Tehran's water governance chain. Ultimately, transitioning from the current condition necessitates a shift from structure-oriented management to forward-looking governance and the enhancement of cross-sectoral coherence in urban development documents.